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ABSTRACT
The introduction of Medicare in 1965 was the single largest change in health insurance coverage in
U.S. history. Many economists and commentators have conjectured that the introduction of Medicare
may have also been an important impetus for the development of new drugs that are now commonly
used  by  the  elderly  and  have  substantially  extended  their  life  expectancy.  In  this  paper,  we
investigate whether Medicare induced pharmaceutical innovations directed towards the elderly.
Medicare could have played such a role only if two conditions were met. First, Medicare would have
to increase drug spending by the elderly. Second, the pharmaceutical companies would have to
respond to the change in market size for drugs caused by Medicare by changing the direction of their
research. Our empirical work finds no evidence of a "first-stage" effect of Medicare on prescription
drug  expenditure  by  the  elderly.  Correspondingly,  we  also  find  no  evidence  of  a  shift  in
pharmaceutical innovation towards therapeutic categories most used by the elderly. On the whole,
therefore, our evidence does not provide support for the hypothesis that Medicare had a major effect
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jlinn@uic.eduI. Introduction
The introduction of Medicare in 1965 was the single largest change in health insurance
coverage in U.S. history. Providing nearly universal public health insurance coverage for
t h ee l d e r l y ,i ti sc u r r e n t l yo n eo ft h el a r g est health insurance programs in the world
(Newhouse, 2002). Its introduction had dramatic eﬀects on health insurance coverage
and health care utilization for the elderly (Cook et al., 2005, Dow 2002, Finkelstein,
2005).
Since the introduction of Medicare, there has also been dramatic progress in the de-
velopment of new pharmaceuticals. For example, Cutler and Kadiyala (2003) estimate
that the development of new pharmaceuticals was responsible for about one-third of the
pronounced decline in cardio-vascular disease mortality over the last-half century. Many
economists have conjectured that Medicare provided part of the impetus for the develop-
ment of new drugs, especially those most commonly used by the elderly (e.g., Lichtenberg,
2004, Cutler, 2004). However, there has been little systematic analysis of this hypothesis.
An impact of Medicare on pharmaceutical innovation would be consistent with recent
empirical evidence of induced innovation in pharmaceuticals more generally. Acemoglu
and Linn (2004) and Finkelstein (2004), for example, ﬁnd that increases in expected
demand for certain types of pharmaceuticals are associated with increases in clinical trials
and FDA approvals for these products. Such an impact on innovation could also have
implications for the cost of the new Medicare prescription drug beneﬁt.
For Medicare to induce innovation in new pharmaceuticals, a necessary (but not
suﬃcient) condition is for it to have increased the demand for prescription drugs among
the elderly. Although prior to 2006 Medicare did not cover prescription drugs, it may
have indirectly increased demand for prescription drugs since it covered physician care,
which may be highly complementary with prescription drug use. In addition, any increase
in pharmaceutical demand among the elderly caused by Medicare would have to be large
enough to induce a change in the direction of technological change in this sector.
In this paper, we investigate the eﬀect of Medicare on development of new pharma-
ceuticals for the elderly. Our strategy follows the logical steps laid out in the previous
paragraph. In Section II, we look for an eﬀect of Medicare on the demand for pharmaceu-
ticals by the elderly. In Section III, we look for a change in the direction of pharmaceutical
innovation after the introduction of Medicare.
1Our investigation provides no support for the conjecture that Medicare had a large
eﬀect on the direction of pharmaceutical innovation. We ﬁnd no evidence that the intro-
duction of Medicare is associated with an increase in drug consumption among the elderly.
Consistent with this, we also ﬁnd no evidence of an increase in approvals of new drugs that
are more likely to be for diseases of the elderly after Medicare’s introduction. Although
data quality issues suggest some caution in interpreting the evidence, our reading is that
there is no compelling case that Medicare induced signiﬁcant pharmaceutical innovation.
II. The Impact of Medicare on Drug Spending
To investigate the impact of Medicare on demand for pharmaceuticals, we compare
changes in drug spending for those aged 55-64 (interpreted as the control group not covered
by the Medicare and referred to as the “nonelderly”) to changes for elderly individuals
aged 65-74. The 1963 and 1970 Surveys of Health Service Utilization and Expenditures,
and their follow-up versions, the 1977 and 1987 National Medical Expenditure Surveys,
contain individual-level data on total prescription drug expenditures.1 About one-ﬁfth of
total health care spending for individuals aged 65-74 in 1963 was for prescription drugs.
Our basic estimating equation is a simple diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences equation of the
form:
Yiat = γt + αa + X
0
iat · η+β · (POST t · Miat)+εiat, (1)
where Yiat denotes prescription drug spending (in 2000 dollars) by individual i in age group
a and year t;t h eγt’s denote a full set of time (survey) dummies; the αa’s denote a full set
of age dummies; Xiat is a vector of covariates (speciﬁcally, dummies for male, married,
and three education categories). Finally POST t is a dummy indicating the introduction
of Medicare, thus taking the value of 1 after 1965, and Miat is a dummy variable for
whether the individual is in the 65-74 age category and thus covered by Medicare. The
coeﬃcient of interest, β, measures the diﬀerential change in drug spending by the elderly
after the introduction of Medicare.
Table 1 reports the results of estimating (1) with OLS. Odd-number columns re-
port results without covariates, while even-numbered columns include the covariates Xiat.
Columns 1 and 2, which use the 1963 and 1970 data only, show no evidence that Medicare
1Spending data are based on individual self-reports, but attempts were made to verify insurance claims
with third party payers. The ﬁrst two surveys do not include usable population weights, so none of our
estimates adjust for survey weights.
2is associated with an increase in prescription drug spending for the elderly relative to the
nonelderly. For example, in column 2 with covariates, the estimate of β is negative,
though statistically insigniﬁcant, and corresponds to a $38 decline in the spending by the
elderly relative to nonelderly. The 95 percent conﬁdence interval excludes an increase in
prescription drug spending associated with Medicare of more than $21, or more than 11
percent relative to the base of $209. Using the same data and methodology, Finkelstein
and McKnight (2005) ﬁnd that the introduction of Medicare is associated with increases
in the physician and hospital spending of individuals that are eligible for Medicare; unlike
drugs, these services were covered by Medicare.
Columns 3 and 4 estimate the same speciﬁcation expanding the “control group”
to include younger individuals (ages 35-64), and the “treatment group” to include older
indivdiuals (ages 65-84). They again indicate that there was no increase in the prescription
drug expenditures of the elderly following the introduction of Medicare.
This evidence suggests that the necessary “ﬁrst stage” for an induced innovation
eﬀect–namely an increase in expected market size–may not be present. However, at the
time of Medicare’s introduction, there was little in the way of eﬀective pharmaceuticals for
the major chronic illnesses of the elderly (e.g., Cutler and Kadiyala, 2003). It is therefore
possible that pharmaceutical companies may have responded to the expected increases in
demand that would occur if they produced new, more eﬀective drugs for the newly-insured
elderly.
To investigate this possibility, we looked at whether prescription drug spending for the
elderly relative to the non-elderly increased with a lag after the introduction of Medicare.
Columns 5 in 6 estimate the analogous speciﬁcation to columns 1 and 2, but using data
from 1963, 1970 and 1977. The estimate of β remains negative and similar in magnitude
to the estimates using only the 1963 and 1970 survey. Columns 7 and 8 add the 1987
survey. The estimate is once again insigniﬁcant and negative, but is now much closer
to zero. Finally, if we modify (1) by replacing the β · (POSTt · Miat) term with a more
ﬂexible speciﬁcation with βt ·γt ·Miat for t =1 9 7 0 , 1977 and 1987, then, β1987 is the only
o n eo ft h e s et h r e ec o e ﬃcients that is positive; all are statisitcally insigniﬁcant.2
2All non-reported results in the paper are available upon request.
3III. The Impact of Medicare on Pharmaceutical Innovation
We next examine whether drugs approved after the introduction of Medicare are for
diseases that are more disproportionately conc e n t r a t e di nt h ee l d e r l yt h a nd r u g sa p p r o v e d
prior to Medicare’s introduction. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) provide more detail on
the data that we use. Data on approval of new drugs from 1950 through 1999 comes
from the FDA. We can identify whether a new drug is a new molecular entity, which
contains active ingredients that have not been previously marketed in the United States
and therefore provides a measure of more radical innovations than the typical new drug
approval. There are 7001 new drug approvals between 1950 and 1999, of which 725 are
new molecular entities. Our key dependent variable is the number of new drug approvals
(or new molecular entities) by year in each of 33 drug therapeutic classes.3
To identify the impact of Medicare on new drug approvals, we create a variable mea-
suring the cross-sectional variation in the elderly’s share of the consumption of drugs across
therapeutic categories, denoted by ESc for category c. The basic logic of our approach
is that if Medicare induced new innovation in drugs for the elderly, it would have more
of an eﬀect on new drug approvals in therapeutic categories that are disproportionately
used by the elderly.
We measure ESc u s i n g1 9 9 6 - 1 9 9 8d a t af r o mt h eM e d i c a lE x pe n d i t u r eS u r v e y( M E P S ) . 4
We compute this variable as the ratio of total prescription drug spending by individuals
aged 65 and older on therapeutic class c to total prescription drug spending for all ages
in the same therapeutic class. The average of ESc is 0.34, with a standard deviation of
0.21. Anticoagulants (ESc =0 .69) are an example of a therapeutic category with a very
3Our 33 drug classes are relatively broad. For example, cardiac drugs are all one class. Since the elderly
share is unlikely to vary within these more aggregated groupings, it is unlikely that we lose much power
from not having a ﬁner graduation of drug categories. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) provide a complete list
of the 33 classes.
4Measuring ESc in 1996-1998 is a central limitation of our empirical strategy. Ideally, we would
measure ESc before Medicare’s introduction. Unfortunately, data on drug use by age and therapeutic
category do not exist from this time period. To the extent that there have been substantial changes in
the ESc over time, there will be downward attenuation bias in our estimates. Somewhat reassuringly,
data from the National Ambulatory Care Survey (NAMCS) indicate that the age distribution of drug
use is fairly similar between 1980 and 2000 (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004).
In general, we prefer the MEPS since the NAMCS is a nonrepresentative sample (only covering drugs
prescribed by doctors in private practice), has a smaller sample size, and only provides information on
the number of drugs consumed (rather than drug spending) in a given therapeutic class. However, all
of our results remain essentially unchanged if we instead use data on the number of drugs used by age
group from the 1980-1981 NAMCS to construct ESc (see Table 3 below).
4high elderly share, while antibiotics (ESc =0 .15) are an example with a very low elderly
share.
Because of our dependent variable is a count (of new drugs or new molecular entities),
we estimate a conditional ﬁxed eﬀect Poisson model. We assume the following conditional
mean function for Nct, which denotes the number of new drug approvals (or new molecular
entities) in therapeutic category c in year t:
E
£
Nct | αc, ¯ Xc
¤
=e x p( αc + γt + X
0
ct · φ+βt · γt · ESc), (2)
where αc’s denote therapeutic category ﬁxed eﬀects, γt’s denote year eﬀects, Xct is log
potential market size for therapeutic category c,a n d ¯ Xc denotes the mean of Xct for
category c o v e rt h es a m p l ep e r i o d . 5 The variables of interest are the interaction between
year dummies and ESc; this is parameterized ﬂexibly, with a diﬀerent coeﬃcient βt for
every year t.
We follow Jerry A. Hausman et al. (1984), and estimate the conditional logit trans-
formation of equation (2):
E
£
Nct | αc, ¯ Xc, ¯ Nc
¤
=
exp(γt + Xct · φ + βt · γt · ESc)
PT
τ=1 exp(γτ + Xct · φ + βτ · γτ · ESc)
¯ Nc, (3)
which factors out the ﬁxed eﬀects, the αc’s, and can be estimated consistently with quasi-
maximum likelihood (Wooldridge, 1999).
If Medicare had an eﬀect on the direction of pharmaceutical innovation, we would
expect βt’s to be positive at some point after 1965. The exact timing of the expected
eﬀect will depend on delays in the research and approval process. Delays of about 10
years, or even more, may well be plausible (DiMasi et al., 1991 Finkelstein, 2004).
Figures 1 and 2 show the pattern of βt’s for total new drug approvals and new
molecular entities respectively. The ﬁg u r e sm a k ei tc l e a rt h a tt h e r ei sn os t a t i s t i c a l l yo r
economically signiﬁcant change towards elderly therapeutic categories following Medicare,
even when we look 10 or more years out to allow for a possibly lagged induced innovation
eﬀect.
5Potential market size in therapeutic class c in year t is constructed using the MEPS data described
above to calculate spending by ﬁve-year age group in each therapeutic class and interpolated data from
the IPUMS to estimate total population by age group in each year. See Acemoglu and Linn (2004) for
more details. In practice, our key results results are not sensitive to whether or not we include this
control.
5Table 2 reports the corresponding regression results from the estimation of (3). The
ﬁrst three columns report results for total drug approvals, while the next three columns are
for new molecular entities.We report results with and without controlling for log potential
market size. Finally, the last two columns estimate the log linear ﬁxed eﬀects model of
Pakes and Griliches (1980), which may be easier to interpret than the conditional ﬁxed
eﬀects Poisson model (though it is not consistent). This estimation method treats Nct =0
as Nct =1 , and uses logNct on the left-hand side, and includes a dummy on the right-hand
side when Nct =0 .
In all cases, to make the results easier to depict and interpret, the full set of year
eﬀect interactions with ESc are replaced with either a dummy for the post-Medicare
period (i.e., Post-1965), or to allow for possible lags, with separate dummy variables for
1965-1975 and post-1975. The point estimates are always statistically insigniﬁcant and
almost always negative, conﬁrming the visual pattern apparent in Figures 1 and 2 that
t h e r ei sn oe v i d e n c eo fa ni n c r e a s ei nd r u ga p p r o v a l sf o rt h ee l d e r l ya f t e rM e d i c a r er e l a t i v e
to before.6
Table 3 repeats the same regressions with an elderly share variable ES0
c constructed
from the 1980 - 1981 NAMCS, and the results are very similar to those in Table 2. These
results suggest that whether we measure elderly share in the mid to late 1990s or somewhat
earlier (particularly using 1980s data from the NAMCS) has little eﬀect on our results.
However, as discussed above, the use of spending patterns in the 1960s may have been
substantially diﬀerent than those captured by our measures of ESc and ES0
c, in which case
there may be signiﬁcant measurement error in our key right-hand side variable, biasing
the coeﬃcients of interest, the βt’s, towards zero. Nevertheless, the fact that our analysis
in the previous section did not show much of an increase in drug spending of the elderly
following Medicare makes us believe that the main reason for the absence of signiﬁcant
eﬀect in Tables 2 and 3 is not data quality, but a lack of a signiﬁcant eﬀect on Medicare
on the direction of pharmaceutical innovation.
Another potential limitation to our results is that we do not allow for diﬀerential
income eﬀects by drug class. If drugs that are less utilized by the elderly are also more
6In these regressions, the log of potential market size variable, which was the focus in Acemoglu and
Linn (2004), is also insigniﬁcant. This is because the quality of this variable deteriorates as we go back in
time, since it is constructed from detailed distribution of drug spending by age from the 1996-1998 MEPS.
Naturally, this raises the question of whether such attenuation bias may also be responsible for the results
in Tables 2 and 3. It is possible that the market size variable in Acemoglu and Linn (2004), which uses
much more detailed drug use information by age than ESc,m a yb em o r ea ﬀected by attenuation bias.
6income elastic, incentives to develop them may have increased over time as incomes have
risen.
Finally, while our estimates suggest that Medicare did not aﬀect the development of
new drugs for the elderly on average, they do not rule out the possibility that Medicare
might have had a disproportionate eﬀect on the relatively more important new drugs,
for example, new anti-hypertensives drugs that have been important in reducing cardio-
vascular disease mortality (e.g., Cutler and Kadiyala, 2003). Although we cannot test
the impact of Medicare on the development of new anti-hypertensives per se, Cook et al.
(2005) ﬁnd no evidence that the introduction of Medicare was associated with an increase
in medication use for high blood pressure among the elderly with hypertension, which
does not support an induced innovation eﬀect of Medicare on anti-hypertensives either.
IV. Conclusion
We found no evidence of an eﬀect of Medicare on new innovation for pharmaceuticals
for the elderly. Although this might appear to contradict ﬁndings by Finkelstein (2004)
and Acemoglu and Linn (2004) concerning the eﬀect of (potential) market size on phar-
maceutical innovation, our interpretation, conﬁrmed by the empirical results in Section
III, is that there is no “ﬁrst stage” of Medicare increasing the market size of drugs used
by the elderly. Medicare covered hospital and doctor expenses but not pharmaceuticals,
so the lack of a ﬁrst stage is not entirely surprising. Looking forward over the next several
decades, our ﬁndings leave open the interesting and important question of whether the
new, 2006 Medicare Part D–which introduces Medicare prescription drug coverage–will
have an induced innovation eﬀect towards pharmaceuticals used by the elderly.
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Notes: The graph is constructed similarly to Figure 1, except that the dependent variable is approvals of new 
molecular entities.
Notes: A Poisson conditional fixed effects model is estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood, where the 
dependent variable is total approvals by year and category. Data points are the estimated coefficients on the 
interactions of year dummies with the elderly market share. The coefficient on the omitted year (1950) is 
normalized to zero. The regression also includes year dummies and log market size. The dashed lines are the 
95 percent confidence intervals, and the vertical line indicates the beginning of Medicare in 1965.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-39.11 -37.74 -15.74 -16.30 -28.13 -27.73 -9.52 -10.74
(31.25) (31.27) (23.76) (23.71) (26.08) (26.11) (25.37) (25.36)
Number of 
Observations 2834 2834 5280 5280 9073 9073 15337 15337
Mean of Dependent 
Variable
184.90 184.90 172.83 172.83 164.93 164.93 231.90 231.90
Control for 
Demographics
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Age Range of 
Sample
55-74 55-74 45-84 45-84 55-74 55-74 55-74 55-74
Survey Years
Notes: The dependent variable is total prescription drug expenditures, in 2000 dollars. Miat is a dummy variable equal to one for individuals 65 and older. 
POST is a dummy variable equal to one for the 1970, 1977 and 1987 NMES. Regressions in colunms 1, 2 and 5-8 include individuals aged 55-74, and 
regressions in columns 3 and 4 include individuals aged 35-74, from the corresponding surveys. All regressions include a full set of survey-year and age 
dummies. Demographics include gender, married, and education level. Observations are weighted by the reciprocal of the number of observations in the 
corresponding survey year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 1
Prescription Drug Expenditure for Elderly vs. Non-Elderly, 1963-1987
Miat x POSTt
1963, 1970, 1977 1963, 1970, 1977, 1987 1963, 1970(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.75 -0.30 -0.17 -0.04
(0.81) (0.88) (0.28) (0.12)
-1.24 -2.08 -1.77 -1.30
(0.89) (0.98) (0.89) (1.02)
-0.65 -2.09 -0.03 0.79
(0.84) (1.23) (0.94) (1.64)























Observations 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650
Control for Market 
Size No No Yes No No Yes No No
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by drug category. In columns 1-3 the dependent variable is total new drug approvals, by category 
and year; the dependent variable in columns 4-6 is approvals of new molecular entities. ESc is the share of total drug expenditure in category c accounted 
for by individuals aged 65 and older. (Post-1965) is a dummy variable equal to one for years 1965-1999; 1965-1975 is a dummy variable equal to one 
during the indicated years; and Post-1975 is a dummy variable equal to one for years 1975-1999. The Poisson model is estimated by quasi-maximum 
likelihood in columns 1-6 (see text). The log linear fixed effects model is estimated by ordinary least squares in columns 7 and 8 (see text). All regressions 
include a full set of year dummies, and columns 7 and 8 include a full set of category dummies. Columns 3 and 6 also control for log market size (see 
text).
ESc x (1965-1975)
ESc x (Post 1975)
Table 2
Impact of Medicare on New Drug Approvals, 1950-1999
ESc x Post-1965 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.82 -0.44 0.32 -0.12
(1.07) (1.03) (0.48) (0.22)
-1.90 -2.44 -1.96 -1.64
(0.97) (1.05) (1.06) (1.16)
-0.61 -1.60 -0.16 0.50
(1.13) (1.47) (1.08) (1.34)























Observations 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650
Control for Market 
Size No No Yes No No Yes No No
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by drug category. ESc' is the share of drug use in category c accounted for by individuals aged 65 
and older, computed using the 1980 and 1981 NAMCS. All other variables and specifications are the same as in Table 2.
ESc' x (1965-1975)
ESc' x (Post 1975)
Table 3
Impact of Medicare on New Drug Approvals using NAMCS, 1950-1999
ESc' x Post-1965 